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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to model route choice behaviour in a tolled road network with a bi-objective
approach, assuming that all users have two objectives: (1) minimise travel time; and (2) minimise toll cost. We assume
further that users have diﬀerent preferences in the sense that for any given path with a speciﬁc toll, there is a limit on
the time that an individual would be willing to spend. Diﬀerent users can have diﬀerent preferences represented by this
indiﬀerence curve between toll and time. Time surplus is deﬁned as the maximum time minus the actual time. Given a
set of paths, the one with the highest (or least negative) time surplus will be the preferred path for the individual. This
will result in a bi-objective equilibrium solution satisfying the time surplus maximisation bi-objective user equilibrium
(TSmaxBUE) condition. That is, for each O-D pair, all individuals are travelling on the path with the highest time
surplus value among all the eﬃcient paths between this O-D pair.
We show that the TSmaxBUE condition is a proper generalisation of user equilibrium with generalised cost function,
and that it is equivalent to bi-objective user equilibrium. We also present a multi-user class version of the TSmaxBUE
condition and demonstrate our concepts with illustrative examples.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Delft University of
Technology
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1. Introduction
The last stage of a conventional four-stage transport planning model, traﬃc assignment, is essentially
modelling the route choice behaviour of travellers and their interactions. Whether a traﬃc assignment model
can realistically represent travel behaviour is, therefore, dependent on the behavioural assumptions behind
the route choice model. In tolling analysis, there are basically two approaches in practice as described in
Florian [17]: (1) models based on generalised cost path choice; and (2) models based on explicit choice of
tolled facilities. These two approaches follow the principles of the two classic traﬃc assignment models in
the literature, namely, the user equilibrium (UE) model and the stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) model.
Wardrop [42] deﬁned user equilibrium as:
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“No user can improve his travel time by unilaterally changing routes.”
This is known as Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle which has two key assumptions: (1) all users have the same
objective, i.e. to minimise travel time or generalised cost; and (2) users have perfect knowledge of the
network, i.e. they know the travel times that would be encountered on all available routes between their
origin and destination. The second assumption is considered to be a strong assumption. Dial [12] was the
ﬁrst to introduce a probabilistic assignment concept to address this problem. He proposed a probabilistic
multipath traﬃc assignment model based on the following functional principles:
1. The model gives all eﬃcient paths between a given origin and destination a non-zero probability of
use, while all ineﬃcient paths have a probability of zero.
2. All eﬃcient paths of equal length have an equal probability of use.
3. When there are two or more eﬃcient paths of unequal length, the shorter has the higher probability of
use.
The meaning of ‘eﬃcient’ paths in Dial’s model is deﬁned as a path that does not backtrack, i.e. as it
progresses from node to node, it always gets further from the origin and closer to the destination. Every
link in an eﬃcient path has its initial node closer to the origin than its ﬁnal node and its ﬁnal node closer
to the destination than its initial node. In this manner, the set of ‘eﬃcient’ paths can be considered as
the reasonable choices. By introducing diversion curves, Dial [12] incorporated the logit function into his
model which enables the solution to be expressed in explicit form. However, congestion eﬀects have not
been considered in this model as link travel time is assumed to be constant.
SUE was developed by Daganzo & Sheﬃ [11] based on variation of the ﬁrst assumption of Wardrop’s
ﬁrst principle by considering the objective as minimising the perceived cost which is modelled as a stochastic
function rather than the static generalised cost function. Daganzo & Sheﬃ [11] deﬁned stochastic user
equilibrium as:
“No user can improve his perceived travel time by unilaterally changing routes”
In order to translate this SUE equilibrium condition into its mathematical deﬁnition, Daganzo & Sheﬃ
introduced a user’s perceived travel time function on route k, T˜k, which has two components as follows:
T˜k = Tk + k, (1)
where Tk is the systematic component which is the measured travel time on route k; and k is an error term
representing the random component which varies from user to user.
Here  is randomly distributed with a mean value of zero. Thus,
E
(
T˜k
)
= Tk. (2)
Every user then evaluates the travel time on all routes and selects the route kmin with the minimum
perceived travel time, i.e.
T˜kmin ≤ T˜k for all k  kmin. (3)
The mathematical conditions for SUE within this modelling framework are formally deﬁned in Daganzo
& Sheﬃ [11]. The assumption on the distribution of the error term, k, varies. The most commonly used
distributions are Gumbell and normal distributions, known as the logit and probit models, respectively.
The assumption of the error term following Gumbell/normal distributions is the key linkage of Dial [12]’s
probabilistic model to Discrete Choice Models, which led to further development of SUE traﬃc assignment
models that appeared later in the literature such as Fisk [16]’s logit-based model and Sheﬃ & Powell [39]’s
probit model. It is important to note that in order to take congestion eﬀects into consideration, travel time
should be ﬂow-dependent. Fisk [16] was the ﬁrst to consider the eﬀect of congestion in a stochastic manner,
as travel time is considered to be independent of traﬃc ﬂow in the previous models [11, 12].
A disadvantage of the probit model is well known as the intensive computational eﬀort requiring Monte
Carlo or other numerical techniques [31, 37]. Logit models have their weaknesses but a very important
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advantage of having a closed form solution. Thus, the most commonly used stochastic traﬃc assignment
model for toll analysis is a logit-based model as described in Florian [17]. The key weakness of the most
commonly used logit-based model is the validity of the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA), which can be stated as:
“Where any two alternatives have a non-zero probability of being chosen, the ratio of one probability over
the other is unaﬀected by the presence or absence of any additional alternative in the choice set [30].”
When it comes to modelling path choice, the IIA property can be easily violated because of extensive
overlapping of possible paths in a choice set for the same origin-destination (OD) pair. Over the last two
decades, there were extensive developments in stochastic route choice models trying to address this weak-
ness. Prashker & Bekhor [33] provide a comprehensive review of the developments. Since the perceived
cost function has two components as shown in Equation (1), this problem can be addressed by tackling either
the systematic or the error component. In principle, the technique being used is to make adjustments to these
two components such that the resulting solution reﬂects reality better. Prashker & Bekhor [33] classiﬁed
the techniques into three categories: (1) modiﬁcations of the basic multinomial logit (MNL) model, such
as C-logit and path-size logit (PSL); (2) generalised extreme value (GEV) models, such as paired combina-
torial logit (PCL) and cross-nested logit (CNL); and (3) logit kernel (LK) or mixed logit models. The ﬁrst
category adjusts the systematic component while the second and the third adjust the error component.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to model route choice behaviour in a tolled network. We
extend our work in Wang et al. [40] on bi-objective traﬃc assignment to incorporate the capability to model
the diﬀerences between individuals in terms of their willingness to pay. First of all, we assume that all users
have two objectives: (1) to minimise travel time; and (2) to minimise toll cost. Users are all rational in the
sense that given a choice set, they will only choose one of the eﬃcient paths. Eﬃcient paths are deﬁned as
the set of paths for each O-D pair for which neither time nor travel time can be improved without worsening
the other [40]. According to this deﬁnition, at equilibrium, all the used paths between a given O-D pair are
eﬃcient. We deﬁne bi-objective user equilibrium (BUE) as follows:
“Under bi-objective user equilibrium conditions traﬃc arranges itself in such a way that no individual trip
maker can improve either his/her toll or travel time or both without worsening the other objective by
unilaterally switching routes.”
Dial [13] is one of the ﬁrst to introduce multiple objectives in traﬃc assignment. According to BUE,
when we consider time and toll cost separately, there is no need to add them up as generalised cost. However,
in Dial’s model [13, 14, 15], a simpliﬁcation was made by adding time and toll cost in a linear choice
function, which is essentially the same as the generalised cost function, but with a probabilistic component
by assuming that the value-of-time (VOT) follows a certain probability density function. As discussed in
Wang et al. [40], Dial’s approach might miss out some eﬃcient paths. In Wang et al. [40], Raith et al. [35],
we developed heuristics to ﬁnd BUE solutions without missing eﬃcient paths. It is clear that according to
the BUE deﬁnition, there would be many possible equilibrium solutions rather than one as in conventional
static UE. Given there are so many possible equilibrium solutions satisfying the BUE condition, we must
further develop this model to incorporate the consideration of individual preferences in order to be able to
replicate their route choice behaviour more realistically.
There is no doubt that route choice behaviour in a tolled road network is stochastic in nature since
individuals might not choose the shortest path for all sorts of reasons and the willingness to pay would
vary among individuals. As discussed above, probabilistic models such as Dial [13]’s or the logit-based
SUE traﬃc assignment models such as Fisk [16]’s all possess some deﬁciencies. The philosophy behind
the proposed model is to overcome these diﬃculties, including the possibility of missing eﬃcient paths in
Dial [13]’s model and the limitations induced by the IIA property of the logit-based SUE traﬃc assignment
model, by introducing an indiﬀerence function which can vary between individuals with no restrictions. As
with any models, there are, however, some key assumptions to be made:
1. Users are all rational in the sense that they will only choose one of the eﬃcient paths.
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2. Users have diﬀerent preferences which can be represented by an indiﬀerence function between toll
and time. Users’ behaviour as represented by this indiﬀerence function is rational, i.e. the maximum
time that a user is willing to spend will always be shorter for higher toll.
3. Preferences among users vary in the sense that their preferred paths can be diﬀerent, even though they
are considering the same choice set.
4. Users have perfect knowledge of the network, as in standard user equilibrium models.
With this new approach, each individual will only choose from a reasonable choice set and choose
according to his/her own preference.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review standard user equilibrium for traﬃc assign-
ment. In Section 3, we introduce bi- and multi-objective user equilibrium and investigate their relationship
with single objective user equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted to the description of our new concept of time
surplus maximisation bi-objective user equilibrium. We show that this generalises user equilibrium based
on generalised cost functions and prove its equivalence to bi-objective user equilibrium. Section 5 provides
an illustrative example of the idea, whereas Section 6 extends the idea to multiple user classes, which is then
illustrated in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 discusses the importance of the ﬁndings in this paper and Section
9 concludes with an outlook for future research.
2. User Equilibrium
In this section we introduce equilibrium models of traﬃc assignment. Let G = (N, A) denote a (trans-
portation) network, where N is a set of |N| nodes and A ⊂ N × N is a set of |A| arcs or links. Moreover,
let Z ⊂ N × N be a set of origin-destination pairs (O-D pairs) and for all p ∈ Z, let Dp denote the demand
for travel between the origin and destination of O-D pair p. Equilibrium models attempt to determine the
amount of traﬃc fa on all links a ∈ A under some assumptions on the behaviour of road users. One of these
assumptions is that road users choose the path k∗ between their origin and destination that minimises a cost
function Ck:
k∗ = argmin{Ck : k ∈ Kp},
where Kp is the set of all simple paths from the origin of O-D pair p to its destination.
To formalise the idea of user equilibrium, let δka be an indicator with δ
k
a = 1 if and only if link a is
contained in path k and 0 otherwise. Then fa =
∑
p∈Z
∑
k∈Kp δ
k
aFk, where Fk is the ﬂow on path k ∈ Kp.
The cost Ck(F) of path k may depend on the entire vector F = (F1, . . . , F|K|) of ﬂows on all paths k ∈ K :=
∪p∈ZKp. The user equilibrium condition of Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle states that the cost of all used paths is
equal and less than that which would be experienced by a single user on any unused route. It is well known
that this principle assumes that all users are the same in that they want to minimise the cost Ck and that all
users have perfect information about the cost function, see e.g. Sheﬃ [38].
Let Up := mink∈Kp Ck(F) denote the minimum cost of any path for O-D pair p ∈ Z. Then, following
e.g. Florian & Hearn [18], the user equilibrium condition can be written mathematically as follows: Path
ﬂow vector F∗ is an equilibrium ﬂow if F∗ satisﬁes conditions (4) – (8):
F∗k (Ck(F
∗) − Up) = 0 for all k ∈ Kp and all p ∈ Z, (4)
Ck(F∗) − Up ≥ 0 for all k ∈ Kp and all p ∈ Z, (5)∑
k∈Kp
F∗k − Dp = 0 for all p ∈ Z, (6)
F∗k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K, (7)
Up ≥ 0 for all p ∈ Z. (8)
Equation (4) states that if ﬂow on path k is positive then the cost Ck(F∗) has to be minimal, whereas if
Ck(F∗) > Up then the ﬂow on path k must be 0. Equation (5) says that all path costs are greater than or equal
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to the minimum. Equation (6) guarantees that demand is satisﬁed, whereas equations (7) and (8) postulate
non-negativity of ﬂow and cost. For future use, let us introduce
Ω := {F : F satisﬁes (6) − (7)} (9)
to denote the set of all feasible path ﬂow vectors F.
Existence of a solution of the network equilibrium model (4) – (8) is guaranteed if the path cost functions
Ck(F) are all positive and continuous. In addition, for uniqueness of the solution, Ck(F) must be strictly
monotone [18].
The most important cost function is travel time. In this paper we use the common Bureau of Public
Roads [7] function to model the relation between travel time and traﬃc ﬂow on any link a ∈ A, i.e.
ta ( fa) = t0a
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣1 + α
(
fa
Ca
)β⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (10)
where t0a is the free-ﬂow travel time on link a, Ca is the practical capacity of link a in vehicles per time unit,
and α, β are function parameters. If the cost function Ck considered in (4) – (8) is path travel time, then
Ck(F) = Tk(F) :=
∑
a∈k
ta( fa) (11)
for all k ∈ K.
Conventional traﬃc assignment assumes that path cost functions Ck(F) are additive and separable.
Additivity means that Ck(F) =
∑
a∈k ca(f) can be written as the sum of link cost functions ca(f), where
f := ( f1, . . . , f|A|) is the link ﬂow vector. Separability means that the link cost functions ca(f) depend only on
the ﬂow fa on link a, i.e. ca(f) = ca( fa).
Under these assumptions it is well known [3] that the network equilibrium model (4) – (8) can be
reformulated as a mathematical programme
min
∑
a∈A
∫ fa
0
ca(x)dx, (12)
subject to
∑
k∈Kp
Fk = Dp for all p ∈ Z, (13)
Fk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K, (14)
fa −
∑
p∈Z
∑
k∈Kp
δkaFk = 0 for all a ∈ A. (15)
Conventional traﬃc assignment based on travel time can, therefore, be solved by algorithms for optimis-
ing a convex function over a polyhedron. The ﬁrst algorithm used for traﬃc assignment is the Frank-Wolfe
algorithm [20] but many others such as path equilibration [10], gradient projection [24] and projected gra-
dient [19] methods have been proposed.
Many researchers have suggested more general cost functions than travel time, see e.g. Chen et al.
[8], Larsson et al. [26]. Most often Ca(F) takes the form of a generalised cost function that incorporates a
linear combination of travel time and a monetary component [14, 27]. A generalised cost function is of the
form
Ck(F) = Mk(F) + αTk(F), (16)
where Mk(F) is the monetary cost associated with path k. This may be composed of diﬀerent factors such
as toll cost and vehicle operating costs. In addition, α is a value of time, i.e. it converts the travel time Tk(F)
into a monetary value. To solve traﬃc assignment problems with generalised cost function (16), one can
apply the same algorithms as for conventional traﬃc assignment, depending on the properties of function
Mk(F). We note, however, that if Ck(F) is not additive, it is necessary to calculate shortest paths based on
non-additive costs [21], a research topic in its own right.
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3. Bi-Objective User Equilibrium
The generalised cost function (16) combines a monetary component and travel time into a single function
via value of time α. It is reasonable to assume that not all users will have the same value of time, so that a
user will choose the route that minimises the generalised cost (16) with a user speciﬁc value of time. Dial
[13] realised this and interpreted the problem as bi-objective problem: Users would be wanting to minimise
both travel time and monetary cost. He observed that at equilibrium, all used path will be eﬃcient.
Deﬁnition 1. Let F ∈ Ω be a feasible ﬂow and Mk(F) and Tk(F) be the monetary and time components of
the cost of path k for all k ∈ Kp.
1. Path k is eﬃcient, if there is no path k′ ∈ Kp such that Mk′ (F) ≤ Mk(F) and Tk′ (F) ≤ Tk(F) with at
least one inequality being strict.
2. If Mk′ (F) ≤ Mk(F) and Tk′ (F) ≤ Tk(F) with at least one strict inequality then path k′ dominates path
k and cost vector (Tk′ (F),Mk′ (F)) dominates (Tk(F,Mk(F)).
Dial [13] describes this idea and an algorithm to ﬁnd the eﬃcient paths which makes use of the gener-
alised cost function (16) with ﬂow independent objectives. Leurent [27] applies the idea in traﬃc assignment
and designs an algorithm to compute the equilibrium in a tolled road network with toll cost and time as the
objectives, where only time is ﬂow dependent. As in Dial [13], Leurent [27] assumes that users make their
route choice decisions based on a generalised cost function and a continuous value of time distribution is
considered. Dial [14, 15] further develops his idea of 1979 into more eﬃcient algorithms to ﬁnd the eﬃcient
paths and to solve the bi-objective equilibrium problem in which both criteria can be ﬂow dependent.
As we have demonstrated in Wang et al. [40], and as the example in Section 5 shows, the procedures
of Dial [15] and Leurent [27] will only compute equilibrium ﬂows that allow positive ﬂows on a subset of
all eﬃcient paths, namely those that are shortest path with respect to the generalised cost function (16) for
some positive value of α. Since all eﬃcient paths can be rational route choices, the work of Leurent and Dial
appears to be limited by the use of the functional form (16) and its underlying assumption of an additive
utility function. Removing this form and allowing for more than two objectives one arrives at the deﬁnition
of multi-objective user equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2. Let G = (N, A) be a network, Z ⊂ N × N be a set of O-D pairs and for all p ∈ Z, let Dp be the
demand of O-D pair p. Let C(i)k (F), i = 1, . . . , r be r cost functions of path k and let Ck(F) denote the cost
vector of path k. Feasible ﬂow F∗ ∈ Ω is a multi-objective equilibrium ﬂow, if whenever Ck(F∗) dominates
Ck′ (F∗) for k, k′ ∈ Kp for any p ∈ Z then Fk′ = 0.
Deﬁnition 2 is the multi-objective generalisation of the equilibrium conditions (4) – (8). Only eﬃcient
paths can carry positive ﬂow, whereas dominated paths have zero ﬂow. If r = 2, we talk about bi-objective
equilibrium ﬂow. In the case of r = 1, Deﬁnition 2 reduces to the standard equilibrium condition. In
Wang et al. [40] we have shown that even for the case r = 2 and even if both objectives are separable and
additive, and one of the objectives does not depend on ﬂow, the multi-objective user equilibrium condition
is not equivalent to a multi-objective version of Beckmann’s formulation (12) – (15). A discussion of the
similarities and diﬀerences of multi-objective equilibrium, optimisation, and vector inequality problems is
provided in [34].
Moreover, there are usually inﬁnitely many ﬂow vectors F ∈ Ω that satisfy the condition of Deﬁnition 2.
The concept of multi-objective user equilibrium therefore provides a general framework for investigating
equilibrium ﬂows in the presence of multiple objectives. Under the assumption that the objectives considered
are those relevant for users’ route choice, one of these multi-objective equilibrium solutions will be realised
in practice. Which one that is will depend on user preferences and trade-oﬀs between the objectives. The
simplest model of user preferences is the additive form as shown in (16). In this paper, we develop a
more general model. But before we proceed to this model, we formally show that the multi-objective user
equilibrium is a proper generalisation of the single objective model with generalised cost (16).
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Proposition 1. Let G = (N, A) be a network, Z ⊂ N × N be a set of O-D pairs and for all p ∈ Z, let Dp be
the demand of O-D pair p. Let r = 2. Let F∗ be an equilibrium ﬂow with respect to generalised cost function
C(F) := C(1)(F) + αC(2)(F) for some positive number α. Then F∗ is also a bi-objective equilibrium ﬂow for
objective functions C(1)(F) and C(2)(F).
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then there exists a p ∈ Z and two paths k, k′ ∈ Kp with Fk, Fk′ > 0 such that
Ck′ (F) dominates Ck(F). Then, because α > 0, it holds that
C(1)k′ (F) + αC
(2)
k′ (F) < C
(1)
k (F) + αC
(2)
k (F),
contradicting the equilibrium condition for the generalised cost function.
In fact, with the same argument, it is possible to show a more general result.
Theorem 1. Let G = (N, A) be a network, Z ⊂ N × N be a set of O-D pairs and for all p ∈ Z, let Dp be the
demand of O-D pair p. Let g : Rr → R be a strictly increasing function in all r arguments. Let F∗ be an
equilibrium ﬂow with respect to generalised cost function C(F) := g(C(F)). Then F∗ is also a multi-objective
equilibrium ﬂow for objective functions C(1)(F), . . . ,C(r)(F).
In Section 4, we will address the case of equilibrium problems with r = 2 objectives, where C(1)k (F) =
Tk(F) and C(2)k (F) = Mk(F) and the monetary objective consists of exogenously deﬁned tolls. We investigate
bi-objective user equilibrium for these functions and a speciﬁc nonlinear function to combine them.
4. The Time Surplus Maximisation Model
In this section, we develop the time surplus maximisation equilibrium model as a new model for route
choice behaviour in tolled road networks. From now on, we will consider two objective functions, namely,
travel time C(1)k (F) = Tk(f) =
∑
a∈k ta(xa), where ta(xa) is the travel time function (10) and toll C
(2)
k (F) =
Mk(f) = τk =
∑
a∈k τa, with exogenously deﬁned link tolls τa. Hence, both path objectives (travel time and
toll) are additive, link travel time and link toll are separable, and link toll does not depend on ﬂow.
4.1. The Indiﬀerence Function
To start with, we assume that given an O-D pair p, each user has an indiﬀerence function between toll
and time. For any given path k with a speciﬁc toll, there is a limit on the time that a user would be willing
to spend. We model this indiﬀerence function as a function Tmaxp : R → R that is strictly decreasing, i.e.
Tmaxp (τ
1
k) < T
max
p (τ
2
k) if τ
1
k > τ
2
k . This takes into account that users would expect to spend less time in traﬃc
if they need to pay a higher toll. An example of an indiﬀerence curve is shown in Figure 1.
Time surplus is deﬁned as the time that the user would be willing to spend minus the actual travel time.
The time surplus for a path can be positive or negative. Given a choice set of paths, the one with the highest
time surplus will be the preferred path for the individual.
A positive time surplus value can be viewed as virtually the pleasure for an individual obtained from
choosing this path, whereas a negative time surplus value can represent an unfavourable choice and the
magnitude of this path being disliked. One would expect that given a set of eﬃcient paths with both positive
and negative time surplus values, only the one with positive time surplus values will be considered. For
example, an individual with an indiﬀerence curve as shown in Figure 1 will only consider the two paths that
have positive time surplus, i.e the ones with τk = 20 and the one with τk = 0. Among these two, the one
with τk = 20 is considered more attractive as the time surplus value is higher.
There is, however, the possibility that all the eﬃcient paths have negative time surplus values for a user
who is both unwilling to pay and to spend time. In that case, we will have to assume either this user would
not travel at all or will have to make a choice based on the negative values. In this paper, we assume that the
total demand is inelastic and hence the user will choose the path with the least negative time surplus value.
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Fig. 1. An indiﬀerence curve between time and toll.
4.2. The Time Surplus Maximisation BUE Condition
Given the indiﬀerence curves Tmaxp for all p ∈ Z, we deﬁne time surplus for path k ∈ Kp as
TS k(F) := Tmaxp (τk) − Tk(f) = Tmaxp
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∑
a∈k
τa
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ −
∑
a∈k
ta( fa). (17)
.
We note that function TS k(F) is not additive because Tmaxp (τ) is only deﬁned for OD pair p but neither
for paths nor for links and, therefore, cannot be written as the sum of link indiﬀerence functions. Moreover,
TmaxP may be non-linear. Hence, all equilibrium models using this function will be path based. Assuming
that users choose the path k∗ with maximum time surplus, i.e.
k∗ = argmin{TS k(F) : k ∈ Kp}, (18)
we can now formulate the Time Surplus Maximisation Bi-objective User Equilibrium (TSmaxBUE) condi-
tion.
Deﬁnition 3. Path ﬂow vector F∗ is called a time surplus maximisation bi-objective user equilibrium ﬂow
if Fk > 0⇒ TS maxk (F∗) ≥ TS maxk′ (F∗) for all k, k′ ∈ Kp, or equivalently, if Tmaxk (F) > TS maxk′ (F)⇒ Fk′ = 0.
In words, the TSmaxBUE condition states that
“Under the Time Surplus Maximisation equilibrium condition traﬃc arranges itself in such a way that no
individual trip maker can improve his/her time surplus by unilaterally switching routes,”
or alternatively
“Under the Time Surplus Maximisation equilibrium condition all individuals are travelling on the path with
the highest time surplus value among all the eﬃcient paths between each O-D pair.”
Next, we show that the TSmaxBUE model is a special case of the general multi-objective user equi-
librium model of Deﬁnition 2, but that it is more general than the single objective user equilibrium with
generalised cost function (16) based on value of time.
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Theorem 2. Let G = (N, A) be a network, Z ⊂ N × N be a set of O-D pairs with demand Dp > 0 for
all p ∈ Z. Let τa denote the toll of link a and ta( fa) be the travel time function of link a. Assume that
F∗ is a TSmaxBUE ﬂow. Then F∗ is also a bi-objective equilibrium ﬂow with respect to the objectives
C(1)(F) = Tk(f) and C(2)(F) = τk.
Proof. We have to show that all paths k with F∗k > 0 are eﬃcient paths with respect to C
(1) and C(2). So
assume that F∗ is such that there is some p ∈ Z and k, k′ ∈ Kp such that C(Fk) dominates C(F)∗k′ . That is,
Tk(F∗k ) ≤ Tk′ (F∗k′ ) and τk ≤ τk′ with one strict inequality.
Then we have
TS k(F∗k ) = T
max
p (τk) − Tk(F∗k ) > Tmaxk′ (τk′ ) − Tk′ (F∗k′ ) = TS k′ (Fk′ ) (19)
because of the dominance and because TS max is a strictly decreasing function. Clearly (19) contradicts the
assumption that F∗ is a TSmaxBUE ﬂow.
It is even possible to prove the converse of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Let G = (N, A) be a network, Z ⊂ N × N be a set of O-D pairs with demand Dp > 0 for all
p ∈ Z. Let τa denote the toll of link a and ta( fa) be the travel time function of link a. Assume that F∗ is
a bi-objective equilibrium ﬂow, with respect to objectives C(1)(F) and C(2)(F) as in Theorem 2. Then there
exists an indiﬀerence function Tmax such that F∗ is also a TSmaxBUE ﬂow.
Proof. Let F∗ be a bi-objective equilibrium ﬂow. According to Deﬁnition 2, all paths with positive ﬂow are
eﬃcient. Let K∗p be the set of all eﬃcient paths for O-D pair p ∈ Z. Then for paths k, k′ ∈ K∗p we have that
τk > τk′ implies Tk(Fk) < Tk′ (Fk′ ) and can therefore order the paths in K∗p = {1, . . . |K∗p|} in such a way that
τk > τk′ and Tk < Tk′ if and only if k > k′.
In case there is no eﬃcient path with τk = 0 or τk = max{τk : k ∈ K} we add (one of) the points (τ0 =
0,T0 = max{Tk(Dp) : k ∈ K, p ∈ Z}) and (τ|K∗p |+1 = max{τk : k ∈ K},T|K∗p |+1 = 0) to the sequence (τk,Tk).
We deﬁne Tmax(τ) as the uniquely determined piecewise linear function through the points (τk,Tk), k =
0, . . . |K∗p| + 1. Clearly Tmax(τ) is strictly decreasing and non-negative.
Now observe that for F∗ we have that TS k(F∗) = 0 for all eﬃcient paths k ∈ K∗p. It remains to show
that there does not exist a path with positive time surplus. To see this, assume that l ∈ Kp is such a path.
TS l(F∗) > 0 implies that Tl(F∗l ) < TS
max(τl). Then either (τl,Tl(F∗l )) < (τk,Tk(F
∗
k )) for some k ∈ K∗p,
contradicting the deﬁnition of K∗p or there are k1, k2 ∈ K∗p such that τk1 < τl < τk2 and Tk1 (F∗k1 ) > Tl(F∗l ) >
Tk2 (F
∗
k2
). In this case, path l does not dominate nor is it dominated by any path k in K∗p. Hence path l is itself
eﬃcient, therefore used in the deﬁnition of Tmax, which implies TS l = 0.
Theorems 2 and 3 imply that the time surplus maximisation equilibrium concept is equivalent to the
bi-objective user equilibrium, although, of course, the function TS max is in general not known beforehand.
We notice that this function is piecewise linear, non-negative and continuous, but in general neither convex
nor concave. Concavitiy/convexity of the indiﬀerence curve TS max indicates willingness/reluctance to pay,
so that TSmaxBUE equilibrium ﬂows with concave/convex indiﬀerence curves will form a subset of all
bi-objective equilibrium ﬂows that is more realistic than arbitrary decreasing indiﬀerence curves.
The next result shows that every equilibrium ﬂow with respect to generalised cost function C(F) =
τk + αTk(Fk), where α > 0 is a positive constant, is also a TSmaxBUE ﬂow.
Theorem 4. Let G = (N, A) be a network, Z ⊂ N × N be a set of O-D pairs with demand Dp > 0 for all
p ∈ Z. Let τa denote the toll of link a and ta( fa) be the travel time function of link a. Assume that F∗ is
an equilibrium ﬂow with respect to the generalised cost objective C(F) = τk + αTk(f). Then there exists an
indiﬀerence curve Tmax such that F∗ is also a TSmaxBUE ﬂow.
Proof. Let F∗ be an equilibrium ﬂow with respect to C and for all p ∈ Z deﬁne Tmaxp (τ) := a0 − 1ατ for some
a0 > 0, e.g a0 = max{Tk(Dp) : k ∈ Kp}. We need to show that for any pair of paths k and k′, with time
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surplus TS k(F) deﬁned using the just deﬁned functions Tmaxp (τ), TS k(Fk) > TS k′ (Fk′ ), implies that Fk′ = 0.
TS k(Fk) > TS k′ (Fk′ ) ⇔
a0 − 1
α
τk − Tk(Fk) > a0 − 1
α
τk′ − Tk′ (Fk′ ) ⇔
1
α
τk′ + Tk′ (Fk′ ) >
1
α
τk + Tk(Fk) ⇔
τk′ + αTk′ (Fk′ ) > τk + αTk(Fk) ⇔
C(Fk′ ) > C(Fk)
Hence, the equilibrium condition for generalised cost function C implies that Fk′ = 0.
The proof of Theorem 4 reveals that any generalised cost equilibrium ﬂow is a special case of a TS-
maxBUE ﬂow, with the choice of a linear indiﬀerence curve Tmax. Notice that only the slope 1/α of this
curve is important, but not its axis intercept a0. In the example of Section 5, we will see that the con-
verse of Theorem 4 does not hold. We can therefore summarise the relationships between generalised cost
equilibrium, time surplus maximisation equilibrium and bi-objective equilibrium in Figure 2.
TSmaxBUE BUE
Generalised 
Cost UE
Theorem 2 
Theorem 3 
Theorem 4 
Fig. 2. The relationship between equilibrium concepts discussed in this paper.
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that the time surplus of a dominated path is never better than that of any
eﬃcient path dominating it, we only include eﬃcient paths in the choice set which gives us a reasonable
choice set. We also note that the time surplus maximisation BUE model basically follows similar functional
principles as outlined in Dial [12].
1. Traﬃc will only be assigned to eﬃcient paths. Note that we deﬁne eﬃcient paths diﬀerently but
basically the meaning of our deﬁnition also identiﬁes the set of reasonable choices.
2. All dominated (ineﬃcient) paths will have zero probability of use.
3. If there are two or more eﬃcient paths, the one with the highest time surplus will be chosen.
We believe that single objective equilibrium models based on generalised cost functions of the form
(16) are restrictive, because they essentially imply, as Theorem 4 shows, a linear indiﬀerence curve between
toll and time. Moreover, [15] and [27] in fact violate the ﬁrst functional principle above, because some
eﬃcient paths in the sense of Deﬁnition 1 will always have zero ﬂow. It is more realistic to assume that
there will be users who are willing to pay to ensure short travel times, whereas others may be reluctant
to pay any tolls, and would accept high travel times in order to avoid tolls. The latter would have convex
indiﬀerence curves, while the former users’ indiﬀerence curves will be concave. Hence, the variability be-
tween individuals in terms of willingness to pay is modelled by the indiﬀerence function which leads to
their diﬀerences in behaviour. We can now classify the various types of equilibrium ﬂow as in Figure 3.
Generalised user equilibrium ﬂows with cost function (16) are TSmaxBUE equilibrium ﬂows with linear
indiﬀerence curves. More general TSmaxBUE equilibrium ﬂows are generated by convex or concave in-
diﬀerence curves, whereas all bi-objective user equilibrium ﬂows are TSmaxBUE equilibrium ﬂows with
arbitrary strictly decreasing indiﬀerence curves. The proof of Theorem 4 shows that such a curve may be
neither convex nor concave.
We introduce the TSmaxBUE concept with multiple user classes in Section 6, but ﬁrst, we brieﬂy address
solving the TSmaxBUE traﬃc assignment problem and present a small illustrative example.
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ΩBUE
TSmaxBUE
with convex
or concave
indifference curves
UE
Fig. 3. Several classes of equilibrium ﬂows.
In order to be able to solve the TSmaxBUE problem, we use the framework of a generalised time function
as introduced in Larsson et al. [26]. Larsson et al. [26] consider time based traﬃc equilibrium, where users
minimise travel time Tk and monetary cost τk via a a generalised time function
θk = Tk + g(τk), (20)
where g : R → R is a nonlinear function, called the time equivalent of money. Larsson et al. [26] showed
that the equilibrium problem with generalised time (20) is equivalent to an optimisation problem.
We introduce the following function g : R→ R:
g(x) = h(0) − h(x), (21)
where h : R → R is a strictly decreasing function on R+0 . Clearly, g is a strictly increasing function of x on
R
+
0 . We substitute T
max for h and deﬁne the path cost function
Ck(F) :=
∑
a∈k
ta( fa) + g(τk) =
∑
a∈k
ta( fa) + Tmax(0) − Tmax(τk). (22)
We observe that because Tmax is a strictly decreasing function of τk, maximising time surplus is equiv-
alent to minimising Ck. Moreover, Ck(F) is positive because Tmax(τ) > 0 for any τ ≥ 0 and because travel
times are positive. Path cost functionCk(Fk) in equation (22) is therefore a generalised time function of form
(20), and we can apply the results of Larsson et al. [26] and formulate the time surplus maximisation equi-
librium problem as a single objective equilibrium problem with generalised time function (22). Applying
the results of Larsson et al. [26], it follows that this equilibrium problem is equivalent to the optimisation
problem (23) – (26), which under our assumptions satisﬁes the conditions for unique link ﬂow solutions in
Larsson et al. [26].
min
∑
a∈A
fa∫
0
ta(x)dx +
∑
p∈Z
∑
k∈Kp
Fkg(τk) (23)
∑
k∈Kp
Fk = Dp for all p ∈ Z, (24)
Fk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K, (25)
fa −
∑
p∈Z
∑
k∈Kp
δkaFk = 0 for all a ∈ A. (26)
In Section 5, we provide an example illustrating the time surplus maximisation BUE concept.
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5. A Four Node Example
5.1. Network Speciﬁcation
Now we consider a four node network as shown in Figure 4 with link characteristics as shown in Table
1.
r
a
b
s
1
2
3
4
5 6
7
8
Tolled links
Toll-free links
Fig. 4. A four node network.
Table 1. Link characteristics of the four node network.
Link Type Distance Free-ﬂow travel time Toll Capacity
(km) (mins) ($) (veh/hr)
1 Expressway 30 18.0 20 3600
2 Highway 30 22.5 15 3600
3 Arterial 10 12.0 1 1800
4 Arterial 20 24.0 0 1800
5 Arterial 2 2.4 0 1800
6 Arterial 5 6.0 0 1800
7 Arterial 20 24.0 0 1800
8 Arterial 10 12.0 1 1800
The single O-D pair is (r, s) and there are only six feasible routes in this network. The routes and their
characteristics are listed in Table 2. Note that Route 1 and Route 2 are the direct routes, with Route 1 being
the fastest with the highest toll while Route 6 is the only toll-free route and the slowest. The total demand
from r to s is ﬁxed at 10,000 vehicles per hour which is just a little bit lower than the network corridor
capacity of 10,800 vehicles per hour. In order to deﬁne the indiﬀerence curve, we only need to specify the
values of TS max(τk) for τk = 0, 1, 2, 15, 20. These values are shown in the last column of Table 2.
The solution F∗ shown in Table 3 is a TSmaxBUE solution. The values of travel time and toll for the
four routes with nonzero ﬂow are illustrated in Figure 5. As Theorem 2 states, all routes with positive ﬂow
are eﬃcient. Toll-free Route 6 is also eﬃcient, but has zero ﬂow because its time surplus, even at free-ﬂow
travel time is negative and less than the equilibrium value. Note that Routes 3 and 4 have identical toll,
travel time, and ﬂow and, therefore, show as a single dot in Figure 5.
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Table 2. Route characteristics of the four node network.
Route Path Length Free-ﬂow Travel Time Toll Max Time
1 1 30 18.0 20 25
2 2 30 22.5 15 40
3 3 − 7 30 36.0 1 50
4 4 − 8 30 36.0 1 50
5 3 − 5 − 8 22 26.4 2 49
6 4 − 6 − 7 45 54.0 0 51
Table 3. Time surplus maximisation BUE solution.
Route Flow Travel time Time Surplus
1 2384.6 18.52 6.48
2 4839.2 33.52 6.48
3 202.9 43.52 6.48
4 202.9 43.52 6.48
5 2370.4 42.52 6.48
6 0.0 54.00 -3.00
We also notice that two of the eﬃcient routes are not optimal for generalised cost (16) for any positive
value of time. Hence, this example demonstrates that there are TSmaxBUE ﬂows that are not equilibrium
ﬂows for generalised cost functions (16), even if a continuous distribution of value of time such as suggested
in Dial [15] is considered. Together with Theorem 4, this means that the time surplus maximisation bi-
objective user equilibrium is indeed more general than generalised cost user equilibrium.
Figure 6 shows in addition to time and toll values the time surplus for each route. This is of course equal
for each used route and larger than the (negative) time surplus of unused Route 6.
6. Time Surplus Maximisation User Equilibrium with Multiple User Classes
In Section 4.2, we indicated that the concept of indiﬀerence curve that underlies the time surplus max-
imisation bi-objective user equilibrium lends itself to multi-user class traﬃc assignment. The shape of the
indiﬀerence curve models users’ attitude towards tolls in terms of willingness to pay. Users who are unwill-
ing to pay tolls would accept higher maximum travel times at zero tolls to avoid the tolls. The shape of their
indiﬀerence curve would be convex, as in Figure 7, whereas users with a strong preference for short travel
time would accept any toll in order to ensure short travel times. Their indiﬀerence curve would be concave
as in Figure 8.
The limiting case for users who are reluctant to pay (whose indiﬀerence curve is convex) is a quasi-
convex function deﬁned as in Equation (27)
Tmaxp (τ) :=
{
0 if 0 < τ ≤ max{τk : k ∈ Kp}
max{Tk(Dp) : k ∈ Kp} if τ = 0, (27)
whereas the limiting case for a user insensitive to paying tolls (with a concave indiﬀerence curve) would be
the quasi-concave function as in Equation (28)
Tmaxp (τ) :=
{
max{Tk(Dp) : k ∈ Kp} if 0 ≤ τ < max{τk : k ∈ Kp}
0 if τ = max{τk : k ∈ Kp}. (28)
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Fig. 5. Eﬃcient paths do not all optimise generalised cost.
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Fig. 6. Time surplus at equilibrium.
Notice that neither Tmaxp nor Tmaxp are strictly decreasing and are, therefore, excluded from being used in
the deﬁnition of indiﬀerence curves in Section 4.1 and the time surplus function (17).
To extend Deﬁnition 3 to the case of multiple user classes, we let M be the ﬁnite set of user classes and
denote by Dpm the demand for travel for O-D pair p ∈ Z and user class m, for all m ∈ M and p ∈ Z. Tmaxpm (τ)
and TS km(F) are, respectively, the indiﬀerence curve for user class m on origin-destination pair p and the
time surplus function of user class m on path k ∈ Kp. Moreover, we index path ﬂows by user class, i.e. Fkm
denotes the ﬂow on path k for user class m. The set of feasible ﬂows for traﬃc assignment with multiple
user classes is deﬁned as
ΩM :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩F ∈ R|K|·|M| :
∑
k∈Kp
Fkm = Dpm for all p ∈ Z and m ∈ M
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ . (29)
Deﬁnition 4. Path ﬂow vector F∗ ∈ ΩM is called a TSmaxBUE ﬂow with multiple user classes if for all
m ∈ M it holds that Fkm > 0 ⇒ TS km(F∗) ≥ TS k′m(F∗) for all k, k′ ∈ Kp, or equivalently, if Tkm(F∗) >
TS k′m(F∗)⇒ Fk′m = 0.
To ﬁnd a solution of the time surplus maximisation bi-objective user equilibrium model with multiple
user classes, we do not extend the method proposed in Larsson et al. [26] as shown in Section 4.2, Equations
(23) – (26). Instead, because the functionsCkm deﬁned analogously to Equation (22) are positive and demand
is ﬁxed and positive, we can formulate the problem as a nonlinear complementarity problem [1, 8] as shown
in (30) – (35). Let Upm be a variable that denotes the minimal value of Ckm for O-D pair p and user class m
(
Ckm(F) − Upm
)
Fkm = 0 for all k ∈ Kp, p ∈ Z and m ∈ M (30)∑
k∈Kp
Fkm − Dpm = 0 for all p ∈ Z and m ∈ M (31)
Ckm(F) − Upm ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K and m ∈ M (32)∑
k∈Kp
Fkm − Dpm ≥ 0 for all p ∈ Z and m ∈ M (33)
Fkm ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K and m ∈ M (34)
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Fig. 7. A convex indiﬀerence curve.
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Fig. 8. A concave indiﬀerence curve.
Upm ≥ 0 for all p ∈ Z and m ∈ M (35)
Following [29] this problem can be solved by optimising the gap function
φ(a, b) =
1
2
(√
a2 + b2 − (a + b)
)2
(36)
applied to the NCP (30) – (35). This leads to the optmisation problem
min
∑
m∈M
∑
p∈Z
∑
k∈Kp
1
2
[√
F2km +
(
Ckm(Fkm) − Upm
)2 − (Fkm +Ckm(Fkm) − Upm)
]2
+
∑
m∈M
∑
p∈Z 12
[√
U2pm +
(∑
k∈Kp Fkm − Dpm
)2 − (Upm +∑k∈Kp Fkm − Dpm
)]2
. (37)
We notice that, as is common with traﬃc assignment problems with multiple user classes, there is no
uniqueness of link or path ﬂows by user class. In Section 7, we provide an example to illustrate the time
surplus maximisation user equilibrium with multiple user classes. We compare this to both user equilibrium
based on linear generalised cost (16) and stochastic user equilibrium, both with multiple user classes deﬁned
by diﬀerent values of time.
7. A Three Link Example
7.1. Network Speciﬁcation
Now we consider a three link example as shown in Figure 9 with route characteristics as shown in Table
4. Note that Route 1 is the fastest with the highest toll while Route 3 is toll free and the slowest. The total
demand from r to s is ﬁxed at 15,000 vehicles per hour. The link travel time is assumed to be a function of
traﬃc ﬂow following the Bureau of Public Roads [7] function as shown in Equation (10). There are three
user classes with diﬀerent levels of willingness to pay. Their respective indiﬀerence curves to the toll values
are shown in Table 5. Since there is only one O-D pair, we omit the index p hereafter.
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r s
1
2
3
Fig. 9. A three link example network.
Table 4. Route characteristics of the three link network.
Route Type Distance Free ﬂow travel time Toll Capacity
(km) (mins) ($) (veh/hr)
1 Expressway 20 12 40 4000
2 Highway 50 30 20 5400
3 Arterial 40 40 0 4800
Table 5. Maximum time willing to spend.
Route Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
k Tmax1 T
max
2 T
max
3
1 12.5 17.5 22.5
2 32.5 37.5 42.5
3 65.0 75.0 85.0
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7.2. The Conventional Solutions (UE, SUE and Social Optimum) with a Single User Class
Assuming demand is inelastic, i.e. all users must travel, the solution space for this three link network
can be represented two-dimensionally as shown in Figure 10, with contours of the total travel time. We ﬁrst
identiﬁed the following solutions, as shown in Figure 10, in the conventional way:
1. the UE solution without tolls;
2. the UE solution with tolls, assuming VOT being $1 per minute;
3. the SUE solution based on a multinomial logit formulation as shown in Equation (38)
Pk =
eθUk∑
a∈A
eθUa
, (38)
where Pk is the probability of path k to be chosen; Uk is the utility of choosing path k; Uk is a function
of the travel time tk and toll τk, i.e. Uk = −ta (xa) × VOT − τk; and θ is the model parameter for
calibration (assuming θ = 0.05); and
4. the Social Optimum (SO) solution, by minimising total travel time, i.e. replacing Equation (12) in the
optimisation problem of Equations (12) – (15) with Equation (39)
minZ(f) =
∑
a∈A
fata. (39)
7.3. The BUE Solution Space
In order to illustrate the BUE solution space in this three link example, we ﬁrst identify the BUE solution
space where the BUE equilibrium condition applies. Because tolls are independent of ﬂow and τ1 > τ2 > τ3,
the BUE condition is satisﬁed whenever
t1( f1) < t2( f2) < t3( f3). (40)
It is, therefore, enough to draw the curves deﬁned by t1( f1) = t2( f2) and t2( f2) = t3(15, 000 − f1 − f2).
The BUE solution space is illustrated three-dimensionally with total travel time as the third dimension in
Figure 11 and two-dimensionally in Figure 12. We then examine the distribution of link ﬂow and link travel
time in this discretised BUE solution space. The boxplots of the link ﬂow and link travel time are illustrated
in Figures 13 and 14, respectively. The link travel time on the toll-free route has a range of 40 minutes to
612 minutes corresponding to a ﬂow range of 1,000 to 15,000 vehicles per hour. The latter case corresponds
to the case of putting all the demand on Route 3; the resulting solution will have a link travel time of 612
minutes on Route 3 while the link travel times on Route 1 and 2 are free-ﬂow at 12 minutes and 30 minutes.
This solution satisﬁes the BUE deﬁnition but obviously we would expect that someone would want to pay
if the travel time is 612 minutes on the toll-free route. Observations made from this three link example
strongly support the urgent need for further speciﬁcation of the equilibrium conditions to represent route
choice behaviour more realistically.
7.4. Time Surplus Maximisation BUE Solution versus UE and SUE Solutions with Multiple User Classes
Now we examine the case of multiple user classes for the TSmaxBUE model and the conventional UE
and SUE models. The three user classes for the TSmaxBUE are as deﬁned in Table 5, while those for UE
and SUE are deﬁned in Table 6. Note that the VOT values are assigned such that Class 1 has the highest
VOT value representing the group that is most willing to pay while Class 3 has the lowest representing those
most unwilling to pay. The θ−value for the SUE cases is ﬁxed at 0.1 representing a relatively low sensitivity
case for illustration purpose.
We solved the TSmaxBUE case with the NCP formulation as shown in equations (30) – (35), the UE
multiple user class case with the mathematical formulation in Yang & Huang [43], Equations (3)–(7), and
the SUE multiple user class case with the heuristics in Florian [17]. The solutions are as shown in Figure
15. The following observations are made:
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Fig. 10. Total travel time contours in the solution space of the three link example.
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Fig. 11. Three-dimensional plot of the BUE solution space.
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Table 6. Multiple user class test parameters for UE & SUE.
Parameter Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
VOT in UE & SUE $3 $2 $1
θ in SUE 0.1 0.1 0.1
Demand 5000 veh/h 5000 veh/h 5000 veh/h
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Fig. 15. Comparisons of equilibrium ﬂows in the UE, SUE, and TSmaxBUE solutions of the three link example.
1. The behaviour as modelled by the UE model is the most extreme. All users in Class 1 will choose the
most expensive tolled Route 1 while all users in Class 3 will choose the toll-free Route 3. Class 2 will
choose only Routes 1 and 2 with a higher proportion on Route 2.
2. In the TSmaxBUE solution shown in the middle of Figure 15, the users in each class choose their
routes based on their respective indiﬀerence curves. Class 1 users will choose Routes 1 and 2; Class
2 users will use all three routes; and Class 3 users, who are most unwilling to pay, will all choose
Route 3. Note, however, that this is only one possible TSmaxBUE solution, due to the solution with
multiple user classes not being unique.
3. To illustrate the other extreme to the UE model, we chose a low θ−value of 0.1 for the SUE case,
the users are relatively less sensitive to the diﬀerences in utility values on each route. As a result, all
classes will use all three routes with the proportions inﬂuenced by their VOT values. That is, more
users from Class 1 will use Route 1 while more users from Class 3 will use Route 3.
8. Discussion
Modelling route choice behaviour is not an easy task, as clearly there are many factors inﬂuencing the
decision. In fact, it is well known from empirical studies that the three most important factors inﬂuencing
route choice behaviour are travel time, travel time reliability and monetary cost [e.g. 2, 6, 25, 28]. In this
paper, we consider two of the three most important factors, i.e. time and toll. In a tolled network, this task
is even more challenging as one would expect that users might have a strong opinion on whether they want
to pay at all or not; and for those who are willing to pay, the time they are willing spend might vary a lot
for the same toll value. The conventional modelling approaches, namely, UE and SUE, have relied on the
speciﬁcation of a value of time by an individual, which is assumed to be a constant. Such model structure is
very restrictive as it implies that individuals will trade oﬀ time and money in the same way for any duration
of the trip. It is natural to think that the longer the duration, the more stressful the trip would be and one
would be more willing to pay. The indiﬀerence curve between toll and time is very likely to be non-linear,
which is also supported by empirical evidence [23]. Although Hensher & Truong [23] recommend that
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value of travel time savings should be speciﬁed as constant for planning purposes, the results from their
experiments have indicated the presence of non-linear eﬀects of time on travel behaviour. In other words,
modelling route choice behaviour with a constant value of time might not be adequate. By considering the
trade oﬀ between toll and time in a two-dimensional space, we can model variability among users with no
restrictions.
By modelling the equilibrium with a bi-objective approach, only eﬃcient paths will be included in the
choice set, which creates a reasonable choice set for each individual naturally.
In terms of modelling the sensitivity of individuals to the diﬀerences in toll and time between alterna-
tives, the use of indiﬀerence curves is also more ﬂexible than the use of sensitivity parameters in the logit
model, since the indiﬀerence curves can be of any form, convex or concave, as long as they are strictly
decreasing.
9. Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we have introduced a new model for route choice in tolled road networks. The model is
based on the idea of bi-objective user equilibrium, which refers to the condition that traﬃc will arrange
itself in such a way that no user can decrease travel time, or toll, or both without worsening the other. Since
bi-objective user equilibrium allows many possible solutions, not all of which are meaningful in practice,
we have augmented the concept with the idea of time surplus maximisation. This idea assumes that a user
has an indiﬀerence function deﬁning for any value of toll the maximum time he/she is willing to spend for
travel between an origin and a destination. The preference of a user can be determined by the time surplus
deﬁned as maximum time willing to spend minus actual travel time. Users are rational and will choose a
route with maximum time surplus among all eﬃcient paths. We demonstrated that this model overcomes
drawbacks of earlier UE models based on generalised cost. We have demonstrated that our model is more
general than traditional models using a (linear) generalised cost function, and is therefore more versatile in
modelling route choice behaviour. We also discussed the time surplus maximisation concept for the case
of multiple user classes which have diﬀerent indiﬀerence curves, i.e. the indiﬀerence function can model
variability among users. To construct the indiﬀerence curves, we can conduct surveys to determine the
maximum time one would be willing to spend for a given toll for each O-D pair. User classes can then be
formed by grouping users with similar indiﬀerence curves as one user class.
Our research opens up many avenues for future work. It will be interesting to compare the routes
identiﬁed as eﬃcient in our model to empirical approaches for choice set generation, which are based on be-
havioural principles, see e.g. Bekhor et al. [4] and Bovy & Fiorenzo-Catalano [5]. Further investigation on
uniqueness of path and link ﬂows based on network topology, as discussed in Milchtaich [32] and Richman
& Shimkin [36] also deserves attention.
In this paper we have only considered the case of inelastic demand, i.e. even users with only routes
with negative time surplus in their choice sets will have to choose a route (the one with least negative time
surplus) and travel. It is natural to extend the model to the elastic case, where users may not travel if their
time surplus is negative on all eﬃcient paths. In this case, we would look at replacing the function of
Equation (17) with TS k(F) =
[
Tmaxp (τk) − Tk(F)
]
+
, i.e. either positive time surplus or zero if time surplus
is negative, as the route choice function. This complicates analysis considerably and is a topic of current
research.
In the future, we will also investigate other combinations of two objectives that are relevant for route
chice. We will also look at the inclusion of travel time reliability in a multi-objective extension of our
model. Travel time reliability has empirically been shown to be one of the three main factors inﬂuencing
route choice along with travel time and monetary cost.
Finally, we note that we have only considered two objectives in user equlibrium models. Naturally, it
is also of interest to consider bi-objective system optimum models. Guo & Yang [22] and Chen & Yang
[9] propose such models. We have proposed a ﬁrst idea for integrating bi-objective user equilibrium with
bi-objective system optimum models in [41].
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